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THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE 
SUPREME COURT AS PANDORA? 
Loren P. Beth* 
THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT. By David M. O'Brien. New York: Praeger 
Publishers. 1981. Pp. x, 207. Cloth $21.95; paper $11.95. 
Pandora's Box. A present which seems valuable, but which in reality is a 
curse. 
-Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable 
Attempts to construct a constitutional "right to know" either for the 
general public, or for the institutional press on behalf of the public, typi-
cally run into grave difficulties, which accounts for the fact that the 
Supreme Court's majority has always and wisely refused to do so directly. 
So runs David O'Brien's major thesis. Why write a book about a doctrine 
that has not been adopted, especially when the writer disapproves of the 
doctrine to begin with? I suppose O'Brien has written this book, not only in 
praise of a wise Court majority, but to help prevent the minority from ever 
achieving its objective. 
That a constitutionally-grounded right to know, or a federally-protected 
"press privilege," might yet prevail remains a distinct possibility. Justice 
Stevens, concurring in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 1 expressed 
the perception that the Court had decided a "watershed case," "unequivo-
cally" holding for the first time that "an arbitrary interference with access 
to important information is an abridgement of the freedoms of speech and 
of the press protected by the First Amendment."2 And Congress, respond-
ing to the Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily ,3 enacted statutory 
restraints on non-suspect searches, but limited the scope of these protections 
to the work-product of journalists, broadcasters, and authors.4 These devel-
* Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. A.B. 1946, Monmouth College; 
M.A. 1948, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1949, University of Chicago. Author, POLITICS, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1962); AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOP• 
MENT 1877-1917 (1972). - Ed. 
l. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
2. 448 U.S. at 582-83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). The case upheld the public's right to 
attend criminal trials absent a compelling reason for exclusion. Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. 608 (1979). 
3. 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of newspaper office does not offend fourth or first 
amendments). 
4. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (Supp. IV 1980). 
§ 2000aa(a) provides in part: 
Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a government officer or employee, 
in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to search for or 
seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a 
purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form 
of public communication, in or affecting interstate commerce. 
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opments, of course, do not signal the imminent triumph of the right to 
know; Justice Stevens wrote only for himself, and a statutory press privilege 
may prove less troublesome than a constitutional one. But these events do 
emphasize the current flux in this area of law and policy, and the difficulty 
of predicting what form - if any - the right to know will ultimately 
assume. 
It should be emphasized, however, that O'Brien is not necessarily op-
posed to a right to know. He admits, and does not severely criticize, the fact 
that in some cases the Supreme Court has protected such a right - al-
though seldom explicitly. For instance, Justice Blackmun in the Virginia 
Pharmacy5 case rested much of his argument on the right of consumers to 
obtain price information about prescriptions. But O'Brien insists that the 
Court should go no further. He thinks that any broad, direct grant of a 
right to know should come from legislatures rather than from the Court. 
Thus he does not appear to disapprove of the Freedom of Information Act, 
state shield laws, or sunshine statutes. Much of his argument is based on 
the theory that legislatures, not courts, should make policy about rights 
which are not enumerated quite specifically in the Constitution. 
Reasons for this willingness to accept - even approve - a politically-
granted right while opposing the same constitutionally-granted right may 
not seem obvious. Basically O'Brien seems to feel that politically-granted 
rights may be easily amended or repealed - "fine-tuned" - when they are 
seen to be unwise or unworkable. But a constitutional right once granted 
cannot easily be taken away and only with difficulty changed. O'Brien relies 
also, of course, on a mild version of what John Hart Ely calls "clause-
bound interpretivism."6 That is, he thinks that the Court should not create 
rights which are not enumerated in the Constitution. But he seems to be-. 
lieve much more strongly that working out a policy based on a right to 
know involves serious practical difficulties, and that the courts are not the 
best place in which to resolve these challenges. 
I. PROBLEMS OF A "RIGHT TO KNOW" 
The primary difficulty with a right to know as a constitutional concept is 
simply that it is not in the Constitution. One may indeed feel that O'Brien's 
opposition to the addition of unenumerated rights is somewhat exaggerated. 
After all, there is ample precedent in the first and other amendments: the 
right to travel is even less obvious than a right to know.7 And of course 
The statute has been interpreted as creating a privilege against searches only for the press-
related classes of individuals enumerated in the text of the statute. See National City Trading 
Corp. v. United States, 635 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding search of law 
office, noting that adoption of the act, "which limits the circumstances under which documen-
tary material may be seized from journalists and authors, does not affect the Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in Zurcher."). 
5. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 
(1976). 
6. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
1. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). Justice Goldberg based the 
right to travel mainly on the fifth amendment, but found the refusal to issue a passpor:t under 
Congressional mandate unconstitutional primarily because of First Amendment 
"overbreadth." 
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there is the right of privacy, which seems to hover uneasily in mid-air 
among the first, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth Amendments.8 Rights 
can, moreover, be read out of as well as into the Constitution: obscenity is 
perhaps the most obvious first amendment example.9 Of course, O'Brien 
treats these (except the last) as examples ad horrendum. But since the right 
to know is clearly in the first amendment area, his argument is not as per-
suasive as it might be. Nevertheless, he argues strongly that neither the 
words nor the history of the amendment justify the creation of such a right. 
What one makes of his argument depends on one's own approach to 
constitutional interpretation. A libertarian-activist (or, to use Ely's pedan-
tic term, a non-interpretivist) such as William 0. Douglas would pay such 
arguments little attention, for to him what matters is what we should have, 
so long as the Constitution does not forbid it and the words can be made to 
accommodate it. 10 But O'Brien, like Ely, feels that the Douglases go too far; 
they break completely from the mooring supposedly provided by the words 
of the Constitution. Unlike Ely, however, he places great stress on the in-
tention of the Framers and on textual analysis. 
A second problem with the right to know lies in the impossibility of 
defining it, or perhaps more accurately, the difficulty of confining it. It is a 
protean concept which seems to take whatever form its advocates wish it to 
have. Some of the problems are briefly discussed below. 
Most advocacy of the right to know seems to ground it in the necessities 
of democracy. It is averred that a people holding the right and power to 
govern must have the information upon which to base wise decisions. But 
this concept - deriving, perhaps, as O'Brien points out, from Alexander 
Meiklejohn11 - seems rather Philistine and anti-cultural, since it places its 
entire emphasis on the kinds of knowledge needed to make governmental 
decisions. It leaves out whole realms of human experience as manifested in 
literature, the arts, and even such mundane newspaper staples as cooking 
and sports. It would not go far toward justifying the consumer's right to 
receive information about the prices of prescription drugs. 12 
On the other hand, a right to know framed broadly enough to include 
all these good things would probably also embrace within its capacious 
folds other things so banal or perhaps even immoral that most people 
would not wish them included. After all, the Court's rationale for exclud-
ing obscenity from the protection of the first amendment seems to be that at 
some point the obscene becomes positively noxious. 13 Even Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan still accepts this idea, at least when the obscene is aimed at 
8. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 
9. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
10. The best example of Douglas' constitutional free-wheeling is probably his concurring 
opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 209 (1973) at 209. 
11. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
12. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
13. See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
IS (1973). 
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or available to children.14 Few would argue that even the adult general 
public really has a right to know about the latest devices for sexual self-
excitation. 
As O'Brien points out, any direct adoption by the Supreme Court of the 
right to know would inevitably involve it in the same kinds of definitional 
struggles that have arisen in the obscenity context. One might point to 
other areas as well, and argue that the Court has mired itself down in its 
attempts to provide concrete definitions for abstract concepts .. Just one -
when is picketing protected speech? - illustrates the point. 15 O'Brien 
clearly believes that for the courts to waste their political capital on such a 
dubious venture is impolitic, to say the least. -
One might add, merely to highlight the complexities of the right to 
know, that in cases under the National Labor Relations Act the courts have 
always accepted the law's limitation of the right of employers to present 
their side in a labor dispute. 16 Evidently, neither Congress nor the judges 
feel that workers are intelligent enough to choose wisely if they hear both 
sides. What happens here to the right to know? The Court has also held, at 
least by implication, that riders on public buses have no right to receive 
campaign ads;17 that on certain highways the occupants of automobiles 
have no right to receive billboard ads; 18 that television viewers have no 
right to receive advertising for cigarettes; 19 that the public has no absolute 
right to receive messages via sound truck,20 or in privately owned shopping 
malls.21 All of these involve kinds of information that are in most circum-
stances perfectly legal. But they are not - at least not always - part of the 
right to know (so far). 
Claims by the institutional press to a position of privilege present a third 
difficulty in developing a right to know. The press has demanded, and in 
some states been given, "shield" laws so that reporters need not divulge 
their sources, even when serious criminal prosecutions are involved. It has 
urged that reporters be given privileged access to sources such as court-
rooms, official meetings, and governmental information. These claims are 
all grounded in the idea that what the press can't know the public can't 
know. This is an idea with great persuasive force, but it ignores complica-
tions which would result from its application.22 O'Brien mentions most of 
these, perhaps too briefly. If a reporter refuses to divulge critical informa-
14. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
15. Some of the Court's perplexity comes through in the shopping center cases. See Hudg-
ens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 
U.S. 308 (1968). 
16. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). 
17. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 297 (1974). 
18. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
19. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), affg. mem. 333 F. 
Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971); 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1976). 
20. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
21. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
22. See generally Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalists?, 7 HOF. L. REV. 595 (1979); 
Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HAsT. L.J. 631 (1975). 
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tion during the course of a criminal trial, what happens to the defendant's 
right to a fair trial? Can government officials negotiate or seriously discuss 
policy options in front of reporters? How is one to define "the press"? 
This last question requires discussion, since it has seldom been raised. 
Even for presidential press conferences, officials have had to develop a 
credentialing system which may and probably does discriminate against the 
occasional publisher, the pamphleteer, or the scholar - all of whose claims 
to information are at least as good as those of a reporter for the Athens, 
Georgia, Banner-Herald, who would probably be given a press card without 
question. Those representing the institutional press do not usually raise the 
issue at all, but this "floodgates" argument is undoubtedly one reason the 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to grant a newsmen's privilege even for 
the right to observe trials. And it is significant both that Congress has never 
passed a shield law,23 and that when it enacted the Freedom oflnformation 
Act the terms of the Act were made applicable generally, not just to the 
press. 
The Freedom of Information Act raises yet another difficulty of the 
right to know. This is the problem of access. It is one thing to provide that 
information shall be available, but quite another to make it accessible to 
those who want it. At the least, it means the possible provision of physical 
facilities such as study rooms; the maintenance of records and files in such 
fashion that they are easily accessible; and the hiring of staff to aid those 
who are searching for information but don't know where it is, how to get it, 
or even whether it exists. All this must be done at taxpayer's expense, of 
course, which means that scholars and pressmen are obtaining their infor-
mation out of tax money. This would add a relatively small but still signifi-
cant amount to the cost of government. 
The last, but hardly the least, of the difficulties with a fully developed 
right to know has to do with information supply. It is the question whether 
government agencies have an affirmative obligation to supply knowledge of 
their decisions and activities, and if so, of which decisions and activities. It 
is one thing to say that agencies must release information when asked for it: 
as we have seen, even this has its problems. But it is quite another thing to 
claim, as some do, that government must actually publicize information. 
Of course all governments do; but traditionally this has been a matter for 
agency or executive discretion. Any significant change in the traditional 
mode would carry with it a pronounced shift in the functions of agency 
public relations offices. And the problem of scope - that is, of what kinds 
of information must be communicated - would be well-nigh impossible. 
The problems of applying a Court-created constitutional right to know 
are, then, numerous and complex. It is reasons of the sort adduced above 
which have led the Court's majority to feel that such a right is outside con-
stitutional protection and that it would be unwise for the Court to espouse 
it. The minority, on the other hand, doubtless feels that the right is so im-
portant that the difficulties must be accepted in order to achieve the greater 
good. 
23. But see note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
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II. WHO Is To DECIDE? 
In addition to the above difficulties, serious as they are, there is a more 
basic question of democratic theory and practice involved. While the 
Supreme Court must be concerned with this question, it is equally impor-
tant to the general public and to those who think and worry about the via-
bility of democracy under the pressures of modern mass communications 
and the mediocrity of mass tastes. The most obvious way to state this con-
cern is merely to ask, ''What should the public know?" A poser, indeed. 
In the absence of a satisfactory answer - and I think that we do not at 
present have one - the question inevitably becomes, ''Who should decide 
what the public is to know?" The possible answers to this question - gov-
ernment, the mass media, the courts, the public itself - each pose such 
great complexities that it is not surprising that no one seems seriously in-
clined to deal with it. Even O'Brien, while he is perfectly sure that the 
courts should not do it, is not entirely clear about the alternatives. 
In highly authoritarian regimes the obvious answer has always been es-
sentially that "papa knows best" - that, in other words, the people need to 
know only those things which their governors wish them to know. This 
answer has never seemed satisfactory in our republican system, in which the 
governors are not only assumed to represent the people, but in a very real 
sense are the people. Despite this, and regardless of forms of government, 
the motivations and tendencies toward secrecy within governmental institu-
tions are all too well known, and apparently are endemic. Government is, 
of course, perfectly willing to decide that the public should know how to 
care for a lawn; but it is understandably less enthusiastic about divulging its 
own decision-making processes or even (in 1919, for instance) the real facts 
about the health of the President. Even capable and public-spirited officials 
often have what seem to them to be (and often may truly be) perfectly valid 
reasons for wishing to maintain confidentiality. "Executive privilege" is 
based on sound arguments that have nothing to do with the Watergate epi-
sode, for it is difficult not only to negotiate in a goldfish bowl, but also to 
govern at all. So it is right for "the people" to be suspicious of those who 
would leave this decision entirely to their rulers, even rulers who have the 
general welfare at heart. · 
It is also doubtful who in government should decide what is to be 
known. Through most of our history there has been little in the way of 
legislative policy in this area, which means that decisions about the public's 
access to information have been made essentially on an ad hoc basis by 
administrative officials with little or no guidance from even the President or 
Governor. Lately, the federal Freedom of Information Act has provided 
some guidance, as have the various state open-records and open-meetings 
laws within their restricted frames of reference. Whatever their merits, these 
laws create or reflect the same problems already discussed. 
Although we in the United States have to a large extent done so, leaving 
the decision to government can thus hardly be justified. An alternative 
would be a press which, like ours, sees itself as the watchdog of the public. 
Our press likes to think that it (collectively) not only can, but should, decide 
what the public should and will "know." Journalists typically start from 
the assumption that the public should know everything, not only about 
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politics and government, but all else as well. What reason there can be for 
such an assumption is difficult to see, although this is not the place to dis-
cuss the matter. It is sufficient here to say that it is very hard to claim that 
the intimate details of Xaviera Hollander's sex life are part of any right to 
know properly construed; to argue thus would be to trivialize the right, and 
the claim would be counter-productive. 
Newsmen are spared the embarrassment of such frivolous claims be-
cause, as they all know, the media could not possibly present the public 
with everything, nor could the public possibly absorb it all. The result is 
that the media give the public only what it seems to want and is most will-
ing to pay for, plus in a few instances what some exceptionally public-spir-
ited editor thinks it ought to know. 
The system that prevails, then, is one in which the working press selects 
what the public will hear, on the basis of its own judgment about what the 
public wants. This group is augmented by those writers, scholars and pub-
licists who constitute the American intelligentsia. Add, too, the contribu-
tions to the public's store of information made by public-interest 
institutions like Ralph Nader's organizations and the Sierra Club. What 
results, finally, is an information-gathering and -editing elite which has 
selected itself as the body to decide. Given limited media time and space, 
this elite decides largely through what it leaves out. No one says or prints 
everything he knows, and the temptation is, of course, to select the facts one 
prefers. 
In such circumstances, the question whether this system is any more 
democratic than one composed of the governing elite is hard to answer. 
The effects of competition among many and various news outlets may well 
be more satisfactory than would government control. As an ideal, however, 
media control of the right to know leaves much to be desired. Among its 
defects is that it would require privileged access by the press to news 
sources with all its problems, as discussed above. 
Since a constitutional right to know would doubtless not be absolute, 
the courts, by finding such a right in the Constitution, would be saddled 
with the task of inclusion and exclusion. It seems unlikely that any set of 
overarching principles could be developed to guide government officials, 
newsmen and the public, and therefore the courts could decide only on a 
frankly case-by-case basis, looking openly at the policy considerations in-
volved in each instance. As a consequence, they would be acting primarily 
in a legislative capacity. 
One could say, indeed, that they are already doing so, even without ben-
efit of a constitutional doctrine. Most right to know cases can and do come 
to court under some other rubric. O'Brien calls attention to the Pentagon 
Papers24 and Progressive25 cases in this regard. Although the Pentagon Pa-
pers case was decided on the basis of the Supreme Court's well-known 
prejudice against prior restraint of publication, there is no doubt that the 
justices felt that there was no overriding reason that the public should not 
have the information contained in the papers, while the New York Times 
24. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
25. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 
610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). 
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explicitly argued that the public had a right to know the facts about the 
government's involvement in Vietnam.26 Even the Times agreed that sensi-
tive national security information should not be published, so that the real 
argument was whether or not this was all that sensitive, and it was the 
Court - not the government or the newspaper - which finally decided the 
question. 
Similarly, in the case involving The Progressive, which the Supreme 
Court never had to decide since it was mooted before it proceeded that far, 
Judge Warren of the District Court explicitly rested his decision to issue an 
injunction against the publication of an article on the construction of ther-
monuclear weapons on his feeling that there was "no plausible reason why 
the public needs to know the technical details about hydrogen bomb 
construction. "27 
The series of court decisions regarding the release of the Nixon tapes, 
first for use in legal proceedings and just recently for general public con-
sumption, illustrates the same point. Judge Sirica, for instance, had to de-
cide which portions of the Watergate tapes should be used at trial. And in 
United States v. Nixon 28 the Supreme Court held that, barring national se-
curity matters, there was no executive privilege preventing release of the 
tapes for trial use.29 This ruling led almost inevitably to the claim that all 
the Nixon tapes - even those unconnected with Watergate - must be 
made public, including those sections dealing with private matters and 
those which the former President sought to have excluded under the execu-
tive privilege doctrine. These tapes are so voluminous that it may take the 
National Archives two years to prepare them for public use, and it would 
take an auditor three years on a five-day, eight-hour per week schedule to 
hear them all. But the Supreme Court nevertheless has mandated their re-
lease. Perhaps wisely, the Court did not provide an opinion to go with its 
decision.30 But there is no possible rationale except the public's right to 
know. 
One can expect a Court headed by Chief Justice Burger to oppose any 
doctrine which might lead to throwing open the door of the Supreme 
Court's conference room, or opening the Court's public proceedings to tele-
vision (even though some states have already done so). But as the above 
examples demonstrate, the federal courts, without acknowledging directly a 
right to know stemming from the first amendment, have in many cases 
reached the same result. 
It is, lastly, conceivable that the right to know might be vested in the 
general public. In fact, that is the trend of American policy. The theory of 
the Freedom of Information Act and the various state open-meeting and 
open-records laws is clearly that the man in the street may walk in and 
26. See Brief for Petitioner, New York Times Co., at 43, New York Times v. United States, 
403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
27. 467 F. Supp. at 994. 
28. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
29. 418 U.S. at 711-13. 
30. See Nixon v. Carmen, 51 U.S.L.W. 3419 (Nov. 29, 1982) (No. 82-218), denying cert. to 
Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346 (1982). 
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demand as of right whatever kinds of information are covered by them.31 
Obviously, given the difficulties of access and of even knowing what might 
be available, the press receives the greatest benefit from such laws, although 
scholars and publicists also benefit. Nevertheless the laws do not in their 
terms create a privileged access by these groups. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has not participated in the trend toward general public access, largely 
because the cases have been brought by the institutional press and thus can 
be decided as "freedom of the press" issues in which the right to know is 
merely ancillary. Even in the Virginia Pharmacy case, although the Court 
discussed the right to receive information about prescription drug prices, it 
decided only that pharmacists had the right under the free speech clause to 
publish the information. 
The picture of millions of Americans storming the State Department to 
discover the "facts" about American policy on Cuba would give one pause 
were it not that we all know it will not happen. In fact, the claim that 
individuals seek information directly from government is exaggerated. In 
general, only those personally involved do so; residents of a neighborhood 
may indeed flood a zoning board meeting. But even so, they are mostly 
there not to learn but to exert influence. They are not, in other words, inter-
ested in the right to know but in the right to use the only kind of political 
clout available to them. 
In sum, O'Brien is probably largely correct in assuming that the public's 
right to know is best secured as it has been so far, by a combination of 
agency discretion, press surveillance, an occasional court decision, and 
some rights legislatively-granted to the general public. What we do no/ 
need is a constitutional principle, especially if it is framed in such a way as 
explicitly to grant the press special access privileges. 
Professor O'Brien has not been well served by his editors. The occa-
sional grammatical lapse has been allowed to stand, and the book has fre-
quent typos which a good editor should have caught. Perhaps Praeger's 
acquisition by CBS has resulted in the application of television's editorial 
standards to the world of books. 
Nevertheless, this is an excellent, sound book. One hopes that our 
Supreme Court justices read it: they can only profit by its analysis of what 
they have been doing. 
31. O'Brien's appendix reprints the Freedom of Information Act, (P. 173, and lists the 
states having open-records and open-meeting laws. P. 179). 
